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Editor’s Summary: On March 27, 2008, the Duke Forum for Law & Social Change 
and the Office of the Dean co-sponsored a Symposium entitled, “Remembering Brown.” 
The panelists discussed both their experiences working to desegregate public schools and 
their perspectives on whether the aspiration of Brown v. Board of Education has been 
fulfilled. Below is a transcript of the event. 
[Transcribed by the Duke Forum for Law & Social Change. The transcript has been 
lightly edited, and citations have been added for ease of reading.] 
 
Moderator: 
NEIL SIEGEL, Associate Professor of Law and Political Science, Duke 
University School of Law 
 
Panelists: 
JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, Professor Emeritus, Duke University School of Law 
JACK GREENBERG, Alphonse Fletcher Professor of Law, Columbia University 
School of Law 
LOUIS H. POLLAK, Senior District Judge, United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 
NEIL SIEGEL: Our students have studied what you did during the Brown v. 
Board of Education1 litigation and what you have written and they are very excited 
that you are here. I want to thank you. I think we all want to thank you for 
everything that you did to redeem our Constitution and our country. It is not 
often in law that one encounters a genuine American hero, and today we find 
ourselves in the presence of three of them. 
I have a lot of questions, but I think I want to stop and just open it up to you 
folks. You’ve heard a lot today; you’ve seen a lot. And I want to give you 
whatever opportunity you would like to speak for yourselves about anything—
really anything that you want (laughter). 
 
 1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN: I’d like to respond to that wonderful and, somewhat 
inaccurate introduction of me (laughter). Let me say in the first place that I want 
to welcome Dean Levi. This is my first public occasion that I can welcome him. 
I’ve known him since he was a high school student (laughter), and his father was 
one of my closest friends when he was president of the University of Chicago. 
I would say secondly that the experience that I had during the litigation of 
Brown  was the result of my rejection of the practice of law when I was in college. 
The reason I rejected it was the first year I was in college we lost our home 
through the remnants of the Great Depression. I was not desensitized to that; I 
thought that my father was an erratic practitioner of the law, and that he was 
starving us to death (laughter). I learned somewhat later that there were other 
forces operating to keep us from our daily bread, and I have long since repented 
for my indictment of my father for his dereliction of duty (laughter). 
Finally, I want to say that in the course of my preparation, I did offer the 
law of the Constitution as one of my fields for my doctorate, and I then 
witnessed some great occasions at Harvard Law School, when I would go over 
there to listen to the law expounded by some of the great people—some of the 
great legal scholars—of all time. I was present the day that Felix Frankfurter was 
confirmed by the United States Congress to go on the Supreme Court, and I 
heard his farewell address. That’s by way of indicating that I had my interest in 
the law although I had long since abandoned any notion that I would starve my 
family by practicing the law (laughter). 
I’m especially proud to be back here at the law school where I spent seven 
wonderful years, and where I learned that you didn’t have to starve to be a 
lawyer. I was particularly pleased to have the opportunity to teach here seven 
years because, as I have said in my own autobiography, I don’t think my life 
would have been complete without the experience that I had here in the law 
school. It was simply a marvelous and refreshing and profitable experience. I 
learned a great deal. It was all new to me and it was a wonderful experience. 
But on the way here, I had some experiences, one of which has been 
mentioned, which helped me a great deal in later life. I was the expert witness—I 
guess you would say—in the case of Johnson v. University of Kentucky.2 And the 
thing that I remember most about that experience is that I didn’t get a chance to 
testify because Thurgood3 sped up the process by insisting that the judge—Judge 
H. Church Ford—hand down the decision based on the lack of information that 
the University of Kentucky advanced. And so although most were shouting, I 
was pouting (laughter); because I really wanted to show off on the witness stand. 
But I made an impression, I suppose, on Thurgood at the time, because he later 
called me at the beginning of the litigation of Brown, and asked me if I would 
testify and assist in the writing of the brief, and I said I would. And he proceeded 
to bring me to Washington every week from August to November [of 1953]. 
I worked with Jack Greenberg and others in trying to answer the questions 
which the Court had propounded when it remanded the case back to the 
 
 2. Johnson v. Bd. of Trustees of U. Ky., 83 F. Supp. 707 (E.D. Ky. 1949). 
 3. “Thurgood” refers to Thurgood Marshall, then director-counsel of the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund (“Legal Defense Fund”), and later Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
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attorneys on both sides with questions which had to be raised. The question of 
the moment—and the one that preoccupied us for the next several months—was 
the question of whether or not the legislators had in mind the abolition of 
segregation in the schools when the Constitution was written. Later, when the 
Fourteenth Amendment was enacted, and when people ratified these documents, 
did they know if they wanted to eliminate segregation? 
Now, obviously we didn’t know a great deal about the law, but we did 
know something about the effort that was made on the part of the people in the 
period of framing the Constitution, in the period of the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and at other times. We knew and we made it clear—I 
hope we made it clear, Jack—to counsel that they had in mind the elimination of 
segregation. 
And I don’t know, really, we didn’t find all that much in federal law or in 
the Constitution itself that would affirm this determination that we had to 
eliminate segregation in the public schools. But the thing that we really 
accomplished was that we made—I’m sorry Jack—we made the legal-side 
experts in Constitutional history, and the history of the Reconstruction period, 
and then the period following that. And I would love to impress you with the 
fact that when these lawyers started with us, they were stumbling and fumbling 
over these provisions of the Constitution, but before they argued this case before 
the Supreme Court they were expert witnesses themselves, and the most 
satisfying experience I had was to listen to the lawyers on the Legal Defense 
Fund as they expounded on the law as great legal historians, and I could say to 
myself, “That’s my boy, that’s my girl,” (laughter) because they were so proficient 
by that time. I want to make some comments in addition about the ramifications 
and result of Brown, but I will let that go for now. Thank you. 
NEIL SIEGEL: I was wondering, Professor Greenberg and Judge Pollak, if I 
could get a sense from you of your present understanding of the meaning of 
Brown. And to get at this, I’d like to ask you about a recent Supreme Court 
decision, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.4 
Recently the Supreme Court, for the first time since Brown, significantly limited 
the ability of local communities to use race in order to integrate—racially 
integrate—their public schools. And in so doing, Chief Justice Roberts—on behalf 
of himself, and Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito—wrote the following, and I’d 
like to get your reaction to it. 
This is Chief Justice Roberts: “The parties (and their amici) debate which 
side is more faithful to the heritage of Brown, but the position of the plaintiffs in 
Brown,” you folks, “was spelled out in their brief and could not have been 
clearer.” And then Chief Justice Roberts quotes from your brief in Brown: “The 
Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from according differential treatment to 
American children on the basis of their color or race.” Then Chief Justice Roberts 
asks rhetorically: 
What do the racial classifications at issue here do, if not accord 
differential treatment on the basis of race? Before Brown, schoolchildren 
were told where they could and could not go to school based on the 
 
 4. 127 S.Ct. 2738 (2007). 
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color of their skin. The school districts in these cases have not carried the 
heavy burden of demonstrating that we should allow this once again- 
even for very different reasons. The way to stop discrimination on the 
basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race. 
 
In your view, did the Chief Justice fairly characterize what you said, and 
more importantly, what you meant in the Brown litigation? And if not, I’d like to 
give you the opportunity, if you’re willing, to speak for yourselves about your 
understanding of what Brown means. 
JACK GREENBERG: The answer to your question is absolutely not. There are 
five surviving lawyers who participated in the Brown case, and if we count John 
Hope Franklin as a lawyer that makes six. And all of us have unanimously said 
that Chief Justice Roberts is wrong in his characterization of what we wrote in 
those briefs. You have to understand we were not legal philosophers, we were 
not the jurisprudes. We were advocates. We not only wrote that brief in Brown, I 
would say altogether twelve to fourteen briefs were written on the side of the 
Plaintiffs in Brown. 
Brown was argued twice. The first time it was argued there were five cases if 
you want to count the District of Columbia case among them. The second time 
there were five cases again. Then on the “all deliberate speed” argument, it was 
argued once more.5 Lawyers in those cases took positions as advocates in which 
they argued the non-classification principle and they argued the non-subjugation 
principle. They were trying to make arguments that would be persuasive to the 
court. It’s what advocates do. 
They weren’t writing a law review article. For him to take out just one 
sentence, or even three sentences out of the briefs makes it absolutely 
nonsensical, and I think everyone who participated on Brown at that time agrees 
with me on that. 
LOUIS H. POLLAK: I would echo what Professor Greenberg has said, very 
emphatically. It is not generally the role of an inferior court judge to engage in 
extended critiques of the opinions by which he is bound (laughter), but I really do 
regard the opinion of the plurality—it was a plurality because Justice Kennedy’s 
separate opinion makes it a majority—I think the plurality opinion was 
inappropriate. Taking the language of the brief in a sort of “gotcha” mentality—, 
saying, “That’s what you guys said in 1953. And we, the Court, did what you 
told us to do, and now you’re stuck with it,”—in a litigation setting is 
inappropriate in the sense that the parties before the Court in the Louisville and 
Seattle cases were different parties. They weren’t responsible for what appeared 
in the Brown briefs. 
But passing that, the language used in 1953 in arguing the five cases was not 
only—what Jack has so precisely said—the language of advocates addressing the 
litigation situation, it was language that had its own historical context, and it was 
the context that Professor Franklin was addressing in his professional 
perspective. Brown was about the use of governmental authority to segregate 
 
 5. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)(holding that the lower courts 
should pursue such decrees and orders necessary to desegregate public schools with “all deliberate 
speed”). 
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people by race for the purpose of subordinating a minority race. And if you want 
the clear text on that, I think John Hope Franklin has given it to us in so many of 
his writings, and standing with it would be Vann Woodward’s classic work, The 
Strange Career of Jim Crow.6 
That’s what Brown was about, and to take the Seattle and Louisville context in 
which government is trying to eliminate forms of disadvantage that may flow 
from decades of disparate treatment of black and other persons of color, to take 
that setting and say, “You can’t do what you’re undertaking to do, the kind of 
reform you’re undertaking”—it’s a very, very modest use of race, only one factor 
at a remote point—”you can’t do that because back in 1953 the Legal Defense 
Fund said” and then quote the words, is to impose on the constitutional process 
an a-historical flaw—it seems to me—of monumental proportions. And it really 
tends to trivialize what the court did in 1954 and unhappily did again last year. 
The question of what Brown meant, I think, was put in focus by Professor 
Charles’s initial remarks,7 in which he sets up two possible ways of looking at 
Brown. We look at it as what government does and attach to that the concern, 
that if government gives preference to one group and puts others in a secondary 
position, is that not a disparagement within constitutional norms? And second—
as I understood Professor Charles’s paradigm—is: was Brown really to be 
addressed as a lesson about citizenship? 
And it was both. And it has to stand for both today. The citizenship sense is 
one of full participation in the American community, and that is hopefully what 
one would try to achieve through a variety of remedial enterprises. And to take 
the decision in a case which resolves systematic disparagement and transfer it to 
what contemporary communities are trying to do to put all their citizens in a 
common enterprise was, in my view, highly inappropriate, and contravenes 
what Brown—fully understood—is really about. The citizenship axis is one which 
I think gets very good expression in some of the writings of Charles Black,8 who 
was one of the very important participants—helping Jack and Thurgood and the 
others who were oral advocates in the framing of the briefs. That’s what was 
being done and was being done importantly. 
Before I finish let me say one further thing, if I may. 
NEIL SIEGEL: Please. 
LOUIS H. POLLAK: Much has been said and much more should be said about 
John Hope Franklin’s unique role. There’s nobody like him. And I hope this 
audience knows what an extraordinary advocate Jack Greenberg is. Following 
Thurgood Marshall as director-counsel of the Legal Defense Fund, his own 
career as a Supreme Court advocate, I think, is statistically a clear match with 
Thurgood’s. In case after case after case after case, Jack Greenberg would come to 
Washington and tell the Supreme Court in slow, measured terms what was to be 
 
 6. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (Commemorative ed., 2001)(1955). 
 7. Professor Guy Uriel Charles, then the interim dean of University of Minnesota Law School, 
introduced the symposium by providing the backdrop of school desegregation. The Duke Forum for 
Law & Social Change would like to thank Professor Charles for his contribution to the panel. 
 8. Professor Charles L. Black, Jr. was a noted scholar of constitutional law, which he taught as a 
professor first at Columbia University, then at Yale University, and, finally, again at Columbia 
University until 1999. Black is noted for helping author the legal briefs in Brown. 
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done—and the judges did it. And I had the privilege of hearing that rhetoric—
that slow, slow (laughter), non-polemic deliberate presentation. It was marvelous. 
NEIL SIEGEL: Thank you very much. Did you say you wanted to say a few 
more things about the historical work you did in Brown? Did you want an 
opportunity to do that, John Hope? 
JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN: First let me say that by the time Thurgood Marshall 
asked me to work on the case—that was in the summer of 1953—I had been 
following the case through the first term it was argued. That was the ‘52–’53 
term. But then I was rather unhappy with the way things were turning out. I 
thought that the Court, in postponing the decision in the Spring of 1953—
everyone was expecting a decision in Brown, but it didn’t come—I thought that 
the Court was simply pulling some kind of special ploy for time or something. 
So I was rather unhappy and unwilling to really waste any more of my time 
with trying to straighten out the Court. And I expressed some hesitation, some 
reluctance, when Thurgood asked me—on the telephone, as I was teaching at 
Cornell University that summer—he said, “What are you going to be doing in 
September?” I said, “I’m going back to the only job I have, and probably the only 
job I ever will have.” That’s what I thought about higher education in this 
country. I had taught at Wisconsin, Harvard and Berkeley and so on, and 
Cornell, and they all just had me there for a semester, thanked me and sent me 
on my way to the next job. So I told Thurgood I was going back to the only job I 
had, and I really wasn’t interested in anything, not in any appeal. Because I 
didn’t have any confidence in the courts or anyone to do something very 
effective, very revolutionary about segregation in the United States. 
And I made it quite clear. And I told Thurgood I didn’t know whether I 
wanted to go to New York or not. And I wish that I could repeat in polite 
company what Thurgood said to me, but he said “If you don’t agree to come and 
work on this case, then you can . . . . “ Fill in the rest (laughter). And you know 
what kind of person he was. And I said, “yes sir.” (laughter) 
And we worked. I can tell you we worked hard. Not merely the counsel—
Jack Greenberg and Robert Carter9 and all the others—but the other non-legal 
groups who were there. We worked hard. I was teaching a full program at 
Howard University, coming back to New York on Wednesday afternoon and 
working Thursday, Friday, Saturday, and Sunday morning, and then getting 
back on the train—no shuttle in those days—getting back on the train and 
coming back to Washington and getting ready for a Monday morning class. It 
was really arduous work and I don’t want anyone to think it was a picnic going 
to New York every week and working as we did until midnight. 
Of course at midnight, Thurgood would say: “Let’s take a five minute 
break.” And I would break out and around the corner to The Algonquin Hotel 
where I remained until the next morning (laughter). I didn’t work all night. Never 
did, never will. But what we need to remember is the sacrifices that were made 
by the legal staff and the non-legal staff. 
I shall never forget: I never went to the Legal Defense Fund offices when I 
 
 9. Judge Robert L. Carter presented part of the oral argument on behalf of petitioners in Brown. 
Carter was also the lead attorney in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). In 1972, Carter was 
appointed a judge of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. 
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didn’t see Thurgood Marshall sitting there. I don’t know when he slept. I don’t 
know if he slept. And for him to say we’ll have a break—to him meant five 
minutes, to me meant ten hours. And the achievement of this group—I am 
speaking of the lawyers now—the achievement of this group was one of the most 
remarkable things I have ever seen in my life. And they were, by that time not 
only great lawyers, they were great historians too—great legal historians. They 
knew as much as we did about the Reconstruction period, and the period 
thereafter. 
So it was a wonderful, rich experience. I wasn’t certain of it at the time. 
Especially when we do all that work, and then they came back with the 
invitations to attend the argument. I said, “Where’s ours?” Thurgood said, “Well 
you know, you’re not a lawyer. We can’t argue for you to have an admission to 
hear the arguments before the Supreme Court.” So all that work went to the legal 
staff—I almost said down the drain (laughter)—but it went to the legal staff, but 
nothing but thank-you to the non-legal staff. But we held our chins up and we 
worked hard. 
Now I did want to say something about the subsequent history of Brown. 
It’s been disappointing all the way through, so far as I’ve been concerned. There 
was never a time when I thought that the country was really interested in doing 
something significant, even revolutionary about segregation in the schools or 
anywhere else. And so every time I looked at what was going on I was 
discouraged. 
I was pessimistic about the possible realization, at any point, that there 
would be a significant move to eliminate segregation, period. And I remember I 
used to talk with Thurgood Marshall after he became Associate Justice. And 
sometimes you could hear the depression in his voice. And I would say, “What’s 
wrong with you?” I would say that to him. And he would say, “Well, if you 
knew what I know, you wouldn’t be happy either.” At one point [the Supreme 
Court] was getting ready to hand down the decision on [Regents of the University 
of California v.] Bakke.10 And at other points, where there was some decision—I 
didn’t know what he was talking about at the time; I found out later—there’d be 
some decision he might be working on. And he’d be unhappy about the way in 
which he thought it was moving. 
I don’t think there is a Supreme Court decision that wracked this country, 
that stirred it up the way Brown did. Can you imagine a large number of United 
States Senators and members of the House of Representatives getting together to 
denounce the Supreme Court decision? And to say they were not going to obey 
it? It’s as though it had been handed down by somebody in kindergarten or 
something. But that’s what happened. 
So Brown got off to a bad start, a terrible start, and I don’t think it ever 
recovered, frankly. And it’s one of the great tragedies of the twentieth century, 
that we could close the century with no more significant advance to the full 
realization of Brown than we had in 1955 or 1956. And so I can only say that the 
Court did its job, but almost no one else in this country did the job that needed to 
be done in order to move significantly toward a society that was equal. 
 
 10. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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NEIL SIEGEL: Well, you certainly did your jobs, and we thank you. And we 
thank you as well for the time you’ve been willing to spend with us today. 
 
Duke Forum for Law & Social Change would like to thank Dr. Franklin, Judge 
Pollak, and Professor Greenberg for doing their parts to bring about educational equality 
for future generations. Dr. Franklin’s legacy continues to inspire us all. 
 
